

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-11

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAM-01 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 H-03 OMB-01 IO-14 OIC-04

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R 201536Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1674

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 1502

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: FRG PLENARY PRESENTATION OF
21 FEBRUARY 1974

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PLENARY PRESENTATION
ON STABILIZING MEASURES TO BE MADE BY THE FRG ON
21 FEBRUARY, AS AGREED AT THE 20 FEBRUARY AHG
MEETING.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. LET ME NOW ADDRESS THE SECOND SUBJECT WHICH MY COLLEAGUES
AND I WISH TO LAY BEFORE YOU TODAY.

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IN DOING SO, I WOULD LIKE TO CALL ATTENTION ONCE MORE TO THE BASIS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF JUNE 28, 1973, WITH WHICH THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS WERE CONCLUDED. IN ITS PARA 2, THIS COMMUNIQUE SET OUT AS THE AGREED DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS THE "MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE"; PARA 3 OF THE SAME COMMUNIQUE RECORDED AGREEMENT "THAT DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE CONSIDERED."

2. BOTH SIDES, THEREFORE, HAVE AGREED THAT ASSOCIATED MEASURES ARE A NECESSARY AND LEGITIMATE SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS AGREEMENT FOLLOWED DISCUSSIONS IN MAY 1973 ON A POSSIBLE AGENDA FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ALREADY PROVIDED THE WARSAW PACT DELEGATIONS WITH A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE KIND OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES THE NATO COUNTRIES HAD ALWAYS HAD IN MIND. ON MAY 17, FOR INSTANCE, THE CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE STATED IN PLENARY SESSION THE NEED FOR ASSOCIATED MEASURES AS FOLLOWS:

3. "WE PROPOSE THAT A FURTHER IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE ARRANGEMENTS TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND TO REDUCE THE DANGER OF MISCALCULATION OF THE INTENTIONS OF EITHER SIDE AND THE FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK." ON MAY 21, HE DESCRIBED THESE AS MEASURES WHOSE FUNCTION IT SHOULD BE TO HAVE A STABILIZING EFFECT, FACILITATE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND HELP TO REDUCE ANXIETIES ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUCH MATTERS AS "REDEPLOYMENT AND OTHER MOVEMENTS OF FORCES".

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND AND IN KEEPING WITH THE AGREEMENTS OF JUNE 28, 1973, MY COLLEAGUES AND I SUBMITTED TO YOU ON NOVEMBER 22, 1973, THREE CATEGORIES OF "ASSOCIATED MEASURES" AS INTEGRAL PART BOTH OF OUR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS AND OF FUTURE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS. THESE CATEGORIES WERE CHARACTERIZED IN PARA 9 AS FOLLOWS: "...MEASURES WHICH WILL

A. BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND ENHANCE STABILITY BY REDUCING THE FEAR OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND THE RISK OF MISCONFIDENTIAL

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UNDERSTANDINGS, FOR EXAMPLE THOSE ARISING FROM AMBIGUOUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES;

B. PROVIDE FOR APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION, THE MODALITIES AND EXTENT OF WHICH SHOULD DEPEND ON THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED;" AND

"C. ENSURE THAT ANY SUCH AGREEMENTS ARE NEITHER CIRCUMVENTED NOR UNDERMINED."

AT THE SAME TIME, MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE POINTED OUT THAT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON THE CONTENT OF SUCH MEASURES WILL BE ADVANCED IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

5. AS AN INITIAL FOLLOW-ON TO PARA 9 A OF THIS OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, IT WAS MY PRIVILEGE TO TABLE, ON DECEMBER 11, 1973, IN THE NAME OF ALL WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, FOUR SPECIFIC STABILIZING MEASURES RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET AND U.S. GROUND FORCES. MR. CHAIRMAN, I WILL QUOTE FROM THAT PRESENTATION THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS:

"- PRE- ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING ROTATIONS;

- PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS;

-LIMITATIONS ON THE SIZE, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS;
AND

-EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS."

6. AT THE TIME, I UNDERLINED THAT THIS LIST WAS NOT EXHAUSTIVE AND THAT WE MIGHT PROPOSE FURTHER MEASURES. I ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT WE WOULD ADVANCE DETAILS ON THE TABLED MEASURES AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. IN DOING SO, MY COLLEAGUES AND I EXPECTED THAT THERE WOULD BE A THOROUGH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN BOTH SIDES ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN GENERAL AND STABILIZING MEASURES IN PARTICULAR.
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SO FAR, THE EASTERN DELEGATES HAVE, HOWEVER, NOT YET SHOWN THE SAME DEGREE OF INTEREST AS WE HAVE IN SUCH MEASURES. IN THIS CONNECTION WE HAVE NOTED THE OMISSION IN MANY EASTERN STATEMENTS OF "ASSOCIATED MEASURES" FROM THE AGREED DESCRIPTION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

8. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC WHO ADDRESSED PARTICIPANTS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE ME ON DECEMBER 11, 1973, STATED THAT SOME STABILIZING MEASURES HAD "NO DIRECT CONNECTION WITH THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS." THIS VIEW WAS, HOWEVER, EXPRESSED BEFORE HE WAS ABLE TO STUDY THE SPECIFIC MEASURES TABLED BY US. SINCE THEN EASTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN IN A POSITION TO UNDERSTAND BETTER THAT THESE PROPOSALS ARE CLEARLY RELATED TO THE SPECIFIC REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY US. INDEED, ONCE WE HAVE HAD AN

OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS AND EXAMINE THESE MEASURES IN DETAIL, IT WILL BECOME FULLY APPARENT THAT THEY WOULD NATURALLY FORM AN INTEGRAL PART OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT AS ENVISAGED BY PARTICIPANTS FROM NATO COUNTRIES. I SHALL DEVOTE THE REMAINDER OF THIS PRESENTATION TO A FURTHER ELUCIDATION OF THIS FACT.

9. WE HAVE NOTED WITH INTEREST THAT THE CSSR REPRESENTATIVE, COMMENTING ON EASTERN PROPOSALS DURING THE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS PERIOD OF HIS PRESS CONFERENCE OF JANUARY 17, MENTIONED POSSIBLE PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION AND CONTROL AS "ASSOCIATED MEASURES". WE VIEW HIS REFERENCE AS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND AS A START TOWARDS A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THESE AND OTHER MEASURES.

10. WHAT ARE TH
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INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-11

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SAM-01 SAJ-01 SS-20 NSC-10 H-03 OMB-01 IO-14 OIC-04

AEC-11 DRC-01 /166 W
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R 201536Z FEB 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1675
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 1502

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

BE PERCEIVED NOT ONLY AS A PART OF LARGE SCALE EXERCISES BUT ALSO OF THE PREPARATION FOR CARRYING OUT ARMED ATTACK UNLESS THEIR PURPOSE IS CLARIFIED.

13. IT IS IMPORTANT TO REALIZE THAT EVEN THE MOST INNOCENT OR ROUTINE MOVEMENTS OF FORCES ON A LARGER SCALE MAY BECOME

DANGEROUS WHEN MISINTERPRETED BY OTHERS AS POTENTIALLY OR ACTUALLY HOSTILE. INDEED, EVEN WHEN THE INTENTIONS CONNECTED WITH MAJOR MOVEMENTS OF FORCES ARE ENTIRELY PEACEFUL, AN ESCALATORY PROCESS OF REACTION AND COUNTER-REACTION MAY BE SET IN MOTION BY THEM. A MEASURE OF PRECAUTION TAKEN IN RESPONSE BY OTHER PARTIES MAY START AN INTERACTION ULTIMATELY LEADING TO A CRISIS ENDANGERING ALL PARTIES. THIS PROCESS COULD BECOME PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS IF THE MISINTERPRETATION OF FORCE MOVEMENTS OCCURED DURING AN ALREADY EXISTING SITUATION OF POLITICAL TENSION. FORCE REDUCTIONS BY THEMSELVES OBVIOUS-
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LY CANNOT ELIMINATE THIS RISK CAUSED BY THE INHERENT AMBIGUITY OF MAJOR FORCE MOVEMENTS. RATHER, THIS RISK WILL CONTINUE AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FORCE REDUCTIONS. THESE MUST THEREFORE BE SUPPLEMENTED BY STABILIZING MEASURES DESIGNED SPECIFICALLY TO COPE WITH THE PROBLEM OF CRISIS STABILITY.

14. THE EARLY AND CORRECT KNOWLEDGE AND INTERPRETATIONS OF FORCE MOVEMENTS WOULD ALSO HELP TO DIMINISH THE POSSIBILITY OF SURPRISE ATTACK. I TRUST THAT THIS ASSESSMENT WILL BE SHARED BY EVERYBODY AROUND THIS TABLE. MY CANADIAN COLLEAGUE, IN HIS PLENARY PRESENTATION ON NOVEMBER 15, 1973, ALREADY EXPLAINED THIS ROLE OF STABILIZING MEASURES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE. MY PRESENTATION AS WELL WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN COMPLETE IF I HAD FAILED TO MENTION THEIR FUNCTION IN CONNECTION WITH OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF SURPRISE ATTACK. IN SPELLING THIS OUT, I DO OF COURSE NOT IMPUTE HOSTILE INTENTIONS TO ANY GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED HERE.

15. MR. CHAIRMAN, FROM WHAT I HAVE EXPLAINED IT FOLLOWS THAT THE STABILIZING MEASURES PROPOSED BY US WOULD BE EQUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS FOR BOTH SIDES. BOTH SIDES WOULD EQUALLY PROFIT FROM MEASURES WHICH WOULD MAKE THE PURPOSE OF SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES OF FORCES LESS AMBIGUOUS. IT WOULD BE IN THE COMMON INTEREST OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO BE ABLE TO PERCEIVE LARGE MOVEMENTS OF FORCES FOR WHAT THEY REALLY ARE. THUS STABILIZING MEASURES DESIGNED TO AID THE DEFENCE IN THE FACE OF POTENTIAL AGGRESSION, WOULD BE TO THE MUTUAL BENEFIT. EQUALLY RESTRICTIONS ON THE MASSING OF FORCES IN THE FORM OF MAJOR EXERCISES WOULD SERVE THE COMMON INTEREST.

16. A PHASE I AGREEMENT AS PROPOSED BY US WILL REDUCE THE LEVEL OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE NEW US AND SOVIET FORCE LEVELS WILL HAVE TO BE RESPECTED BY BOTH SIDES. AT THE SAME TIME, BOTH SIDES WILL WISH TO CONTINUE THEIR CURRENT PRACTICE OF BRINGING FORCES INTO THE AREA FOR REPLACEMENT, ROTATION OR EXERCISES. THIS IN TURN WILL REQUIRE EXCEPTIONS OF LIMITED SIZE AND DURATION TO BE MADE IN THE NEW US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE

LEVELS. FOR THIS REASON, FORCE MOVEMENTS RELATED TO REPLACE-
MENTS, ROTATIONS AND EXERCISES IN THE AREA MUST BE LIMITED
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IN CERTAIN WAYS. THEY MUST CLEARLY BE REGULATED AND KEPT
TRACK OF BY BOTH SIDES IN A WAY WHICH AVOIDS MISUNDER-
STANDINGS AND MIS-APPREHENSIONS AS TO THE MAINTENANCE OF
THE AGREED FORCE LEVELS. THE MEASURES WE HAVE IN MIND WILL
HELP TO ACHIEVE THESE RESULTS. THEY WOULD PERMIT THOSE US
AND SOVIET FORCE MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES WHICH ARE REQUIRED
FOR NARMAL MILITARY PURPOSES ON EACH SIDE AND YET CLEARLY
DEFINE THEIR LEVELS OF ACTIVITY. FORCE ACTIVITIES ABOVE
THESE LEVELS WOULD, BY DEFINITION, BE CONSIDERED AS POTENTIALLY
DESTABILIZING AND WOULD THEREFORE BECOME LEGITIMATE GROUND
FOR CONCERN FOR THE OTHER SIDE.

17. IN FURTHER PRESENTATIONS MY COLLEAGUES WILL DISCUSS THESE
CONCEPTS MORE FULLY AND PRESENT DETAILS ON THE STABILIZING
MEASURES THEMSELVES.

18. THE STATES REPRESENTED AROUND THIS TABLE ARE
COMMITTED TO THE TASK OF REDUCING MILITARY CONFRONTATION
IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND OF LESSENING ITS RISKS AS LONG
AS IT STILL EXISTS. WITH THIS VITAL GOAL IN MIND,
MY COLLEAGUES AND I TRUST THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS WILL
ULTIMATELY WELCOME BOTH ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY
GROUNDS OUR PROPOSALS FOR SUPPORTING FORCE REDUCTIONS
BY ASSOCIATED MEASURES INCLUDING STABILIZING MEASURES.
IT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO ALL THAT STABILIZING MEASURES,
AS THEIR NAME INDICATES, WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT, AND
INDEED NECESSARY, CONTRIBUTION TO THE AGREED COMMON
AIM OF ENHANCING STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE
HAVE NOT PROPOSED, AND WILL NOT PROPOSE STABILIZING
MEASURES WHICH WOULD BE TO THE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE
OR DISADVANTAGE OF ONE SIDE. WE HAVE SKETCHED OUT
OBLIGATIONS FROM WHICH BOTH SIDES WOULD BENEFIT
EQUALLY. THE OBLIGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES WOULD BE
SOUND IN THEIR SCOPE, SPECIFIC IN THEIR APPLICATION, AND
EFFECTIVE IN THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY.
BOTH SIDES WOULD BENEFIT SINCE THE MEASURES WOULD

- ENHANCE STABILITY THROUGH BETTER INFORMATION ON
MILITARY ACTIVITIES,

- REDUCE THE RISK OF MININTERPRETATION OF INTENTIONS,
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AND THUS

- REDUCE THE RISKS BOTH OF CRISES AND OF SURPRISE
ATTACK.

END TEXT. HUMES

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Message Attributes

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